Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Committeee of Consumer Services; Parowan
Valley Pumpers association, Cedar Valley Pumpers
association and Beryl Pumpers association;
Enterprise Valley Pumpers , Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of Utah; Milly 0. Bernard, Chairman;
Kenneth Rigtrup, Commissioner; and Pavid R.
Irvine, Commissioner : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Grant Macfarlane, Jr., Patrick Shea; Attorneys for CP National Corporation
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Comm. Consumer Svcs v. Utah Public Svc Comm'n, No. 16891 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2160

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES;
PAROWAN VALLEY PUMPERS ASSOCIATION, CEDAR VALLEY Pill1PERS
ASSOCIATION and BERYL PUMPERS
ASSOCIATION; ENTERPRISE VALLEY
PUMPERS, INC.,
Appellants,
CASE NO.

vs.

16891

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH; MILLY 0. BERNARD, Chairman; KENNETH RIGTRUP, Commissioner; and DAVID R. IRVINE,
Commissioner, and CP NATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
C. P. NATIONAL CORPORATION
An Appeal of the Supplemental Report
and Order of January 11, 1980 of the
Public Service Commission.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Grant Macfarlane, Jr.
Patrick Shea
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for CP National
· Corporation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION .

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . .

2

NATURE OF THE CASE

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

POINT II:

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS
DETERMINED THAT THE RATES IN EFFECT DURING
THE TIME PERIOD IN DISPUTE WERE JUST AND
REASONABLE RATES. THE COMMISSION'S
FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND IT IS NOT THE PREROGATIVE
OF THE COURT TO OR..")ER A CUSTOMER REFUUD.

8

WHEN A COMMISSION ORDER IS REVERSED AND
REMANDED BY THE SUPREME COURT THE
COMMISSION MAY ADD TO, MODIFY OR COMPLETE
THE FINDINGS AND/OR ORDER .

10

WHEN A RATE IS FIXED BY THE COMMISSION
AND HAS NOT BEEN SUSPENDED DURING THE
PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL NO REFUND CAN BE
OBTAINED FROM THE UTILITY COMPANY .

13

POINT IV:

SECTION 54-7-17 UCA 1953 DOES NOT REQUIRE
OR PERMIT A REFUND IN THIS CASE .

17

POINT V:

A REFUND ORDER WOULD BE CLEARLY AGAINST
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE HEARD BY THE
COMMISSION. EVEN IF THE COMMISSION WAS
WITHOUT POWER TO MODIFY ITS FINDINGS IT
HAS THE POWER IN A PASS THRU CASE TO
PLACE A RATE INTO EFFECT FOR A PRIOR
PERIOD OF TIME TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF
UTILITY EXPENSES

22

POINT III:

CONCLUSION .

28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AUTHORITIES CITED
__ Pages

CASES
Barnes v. Kesler & Sons. Const. Co. 549 P.2d 411 . . .

12

California Manufacturers Association vs.
Connnission, Southern Cali ornia Gas
San Diego Gas an Electric Company,
595 P. 2d 98, 100, 103 . . . . . . .

25' 26

Public Utilit
Com an and
Ca i ornia (1979)
. . . . . . . . .

21
City of Los Angeles vs. the Public Service Commission
(Caiifornia 497 P.Zd 786) . . . . . . . . . . . .

20' 21

City of Los AnHeles et al, vs. Public Utility Commission
et al., 1 2 Cal. Rptr. 313, 497 P.2d 785 . . . . .

23' 24,

City of Los Angeles vs. Public Utility Commission et al,
(California) 497 P. Zd 785 . . .
. . . . . . . . .

21

Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972) .

11

Doe vs. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 P.781

11

Dunn vs. Wallingford, 47 Utah 491, 155 P.347 . .

11

Foshee vs. General Telephone Co. of the Southeast
(Alabama), 322. So.2d 715, 717
....

15, 16

Greenhalgh vs. United Tintic Mines Company 42 Utah 524,
132 p. 390 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Hargrave vs. Leigh, 73 Utah 178, 272 P.289 . . .

11

Keco Industries, Inc. vs. The Cincinnati & Suburban Bell
Tel. Co. (Ohio), 141 N.E.Zd 465, 468-469 . . . .

14, lJ'.

Mandel Brothers, Inc. vs. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co.
(Illinois), 117 N.E.2d 774, 775 . . . . . . . . .

15

The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph vs. Public
Service Commission, 107 Utah 520, 155 P.2d 184 . . .

20

The Mountain States Tele
ervice Commission

20' 21

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. vs. Public
Utility Commission, supra . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

Openshaw v. Young, 107 Utah 399, 152 P.2d 84 (1944)

11
24, 25

Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Public Util. Comm. supra,
62 Cal.Zd 634, 649-656, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1,401 P.2d 353.

24

Parowan Pum ers Association v. Public Service Commission
p.

7'

. . . . . .

. ..... .

3' 10
24

State vs. Alabama Public Service Commission (Alabama)
307 So. 2d 521 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

Straube vs. Bowlin~ Green Gas Co. (Missouri), 227
s.w. 2d 666, 71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

Taylor vs. Sorensen, 30 Utah 2d 275, 516 P.2d 1394 (1973).

11, 12

Utah Association of Creditmen vs. Homefire Insurance
Company, 36 Utah 20, 102 P.361
.....

12

Utah De artment of Business Re ulation vs. Public Service
Conu:nission, Case No. 1
l, opinion June
Utah State Road Commission vs. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d
888 (Utah 1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·

9
11

TREATISES
9 Am Jur 542, § 175

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

STATUTES
Section 54-7-17(1)(2)(3)(4) U.C.A. 1953

· Section 54-7-12 U.C.A. 1953

...... · · ·

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

14, 17,
18, 19
28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES;
PAROWAN VALLEY PUMPERS ASSOCIATION, CEDAR VALLEY PUMPERS
ASSOCIATION and BERYL PUMPERS
ASSOCIATION; ENTERPRISE VALLEY
PUMPERS , INC . ,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO.

vs.

16891

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH; MILLY 0. BERNARD, Chairman; KENNETH RIGTRUP, Commissioner; and DAVID R. IRVINE,
Commissioner; and C. P. NATIONAL
CORPORATION,
Defendants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a second appeal in a rate case filed by CP
National Corporation (formerly California-Pacific Utilities
Company and herein "CPN").

In 1976 the Utah Public Service

Commission ordered CPN to increase its rates to·recover 53.03%
of costs associated with a new transmission line constructed to
serve its Utah electric customers.

CPN and Parowan Pumpers

Association et. al, each appealed.

CPN contended that the

Commission should have granted a rate increase to allow recovery

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1-

of 100% of its costs.

Parowan Pumpers Association argued that

no increase should have been allowed.

The Court found incon-

sistencies in the Commission's order and remanded with instructions
to conduct further hearings, if necessary, and to harmonize its
findings and order.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
After further hearings the Commission amended and
supplemented the findings and conclusions of its earlier order
leaving the ordering provisions undisturbed and denied a petition
for customer refunds for the effective period of the order.

The

Committee of Consumer Services and certain customers appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek an order directing the Commission to order
a refund.

CPN asked the Court to affirm the Connnission's

order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 8, 1977 the Utah Public Service Commission
issued a "Final Report and Order" (hereinafter the "February 18,
Order") on the application of CPN for authority to pass along
to its electric customers in Iron and Washington Counties
costs charged to CPN by Utah Power & Light Company for construction
of an electric transmission line.

The Commission allowed re-

covery of 53.03% of such costs and ordered a rate increase
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accordingly.

Neither the utility nor the

protestants were

satisfied and both petitioned the Commission for rehearing.
Each petition was denied by the Commission.
thereafter sought review by the Court.

Each petitioner

The February 18

of the Commission was reviewed by the Court.

Order

On October 5, 1978

the Court reversed and remanded to the Commission and instructed
it to "take such action, including further hearings, if necessary,
as it deems advisable for the purpose of achieving a harmonious
relationship between its findings and order."

Parowan Pumpers

Association v. Public Service Commission 586 P.2d 407, 409.
After the Supreme Court's decision the Commission
consolidated a related case then pending before it, and on
February 9, 1978 conducted a prehearing conference on the
consolidated cases.

The conference resulted in a Pre-hearing

Order and Notice of Hearing dated November 30, 1978.

As related

to the present appeal the Commission framed the issues as follows:
"(a) Does the decision of the Utah Supreme
Court in Case 76-023-04 and the remand pursuant to
that decision require or allow modification of the
Commission's Final Report and Order in that Case
without necessity for further evidentiary hearings?
If so, what modification, if any, should the
Commission make with respect to the said Final
Report and Order?" (R4-6)
On December 4, 1978 the Commission heard oral arguments on the foregoing issue after which the parties filed
written memoranda in support of their respective positions.
The Committee of Consumer Services (herein "CCS") filed a
petition for refund by which it asked the Commission to order
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CPN to refund revenue collected as a result of the revenue increase authorized by the February 18 Order.

On March 24, 1979, the Commission issued an order
directing further consolidation of a third related case.

At

the same time the Commission reopened the record in Case No.
76-023-04 and directed that a further prehearing conference
be held on April 23, 1979 (R24-25).
All parties appeared at the Pre-hearing Conferences
on April 23, 1979.

The Commission issued a Pre-hearing Order

on April 25, 1979.

As related to this appeal, the Pre-hearing

Order stated that the issues before the Commission were:

"(a)

In what particulars should the findings, conclusions and or
order be modified or added to in order to harmonize the findings
and order of the Commission's Report and Order issued February 18,
1977, [and] (b) Should CP National be ordered to refund any
portion of the revenues collected by it under the Report and
Order of February 18, 1977?" (R27-28)

The same order framed

other issues common to the three cases, each dealing with
allocation of transmission expenses for rate-making purposes.
The Commission conducted Evidentiary Hearings on the
three consolidated cases from May 3 through May 9.

The case

was submitted on written memoranda.

On January 11, 1980 the Commission issued a Supplemental
Report and Order (herein the "Supplemental Order") deciding the
issues on remand.

The Supplemental Order identified and re-

conciled the inconsistencies of the February 18 Order.

First
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acknowledging that the February 18 Order was "inartfully drawn
and was hastily issued under the pressures of a heavy caseload of hearings and paperwork" (Rl24), the Commission made the
following findings and conclusions which explained the rationale
of the February 18 order:
"5. The electric service agreement entered
between UP&L and CPN was in fact necessary for a
firm supply of energy and for construction of new
transmission facilities required for service to CPN's
customers. That agreement was in the public interest.
Expenses for construction of the new transmission line
were necessary and reasonable expenses for continued
electric service to CPN's Cedar City District customers.
At the time the new line was energized, the existing
transmission facilities were already overloaded and
inadequate to provide necessary transmission. Continued service required new transmission capacity.
However, the new transmission line was used to provide
electric service not only to CPN's retail electric
customers but also for wheeling of energy for the
Bureau of Reclamation under the Wheeling Agreement
referred to in the Commission's Findings. The
Commission allowed CPN to cover only 53.03 percent
of the transmission line expense because that was
the ratio of use as between the utilities' electric
customers and the wheeling of energy for the Bureau.
The Commission made precisely the same allocation
of expenses in the next succeeding general rate case,
Case No. 77-023-08, and neither the Committee of
Consumer Services nor any protestant or other party
appealed that decision. The increase granted by the
February 18, 1977 Order was fully justified, and the
rates fixed by that Order were just and reasonable
rates." (Rl24-125)
The Supplemental Order then directed amendment of the February

18 Order to the extent inconsistent with the above quoted
findings.

The order amended and supplemented the findings of

the February 18 Order, accordingly, and then provided:
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That in all respects
not inconsistent with this Supplemental Report and
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Order, the February 18 Order is and shall remain
in full force and effect and particularly that the
rates fixed by the ordering provisions thereof are
and were just and reasonable rates for the effective
period of the Order.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the petition for
refund filed on behalf of the Committee of Consumer
Services is denied." (125-126)
CCS appeals contending that the Commission should have ordered
a refund for the effective period of the February 18 order.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS
DE'FERMINED THAT THE RATES IN EFFECT
DURING THE TIME PERIOD IN DISPUTE
WERE JUST AND REASONABLE RATES. THE
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND IT IS NOT
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE COURT TO ORDER
A CUSTOMER REFUND
POINT II
WHEN A COMMISSION ORDER IS REVERSED
AND REMANDED BY THE SUPREME COURT
THE COMMISSION MAY ADD TO, MODIFY
OR COMPLETE THE FINDINGS AND/OR ORDER
POINT III
WHEN A RATE IS FIXED BY THE COMMISSION
AND HAS NOT BEEN SUSPENDED DURING THE
PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL NO REFUND CAN BE
OBTAINED FROM THE UTILITY COMPANY
POINT IV
SECTION 54-7-17 UCA 1953 DOES NOT REQUIRE
OR PERMIT A REFUND IN THIS CASE
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POINT V
A REFUND ORDER WOULD BE CLEARLY
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
HEARD BY THE COMMISSION. EVEN IF
THE COMMISSION WAS WITHOUT POWER TO
MODIFY ITS FINDINGS IT HAS THE POWER
IN A PASS THRU CASE TO PLACE A RATE
INTO EFFECT FOR A PRIOR PERIOD OF
TIME TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF UTILITY
EXPENSES
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PUBLIC SERVIOE COMMISSION HAS DETERMINED
THAT THE RATES IN EFFECT DURING THE TIME PERIOD
IN DISPUTE WERE JUST AND REASONABLE RATES. THE
COMMISSIDON'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND IT IS NOT THE PREROGATIVE OF THE
COURT TO ORDER A CUSTOMER REFUND.
The Cormnission's first order became effective February
18, 1977.

Rates fixed by that order were superceded by an order

in a subsequent rate case which became effective May 23, 1978.
The record in the first case consisted of hundreds of pages of
testimony dealing with the issue of allocation of transmission
expenses for rate-making purposes.

On remand the Cormnission re-

opened the hearings and took additional testimony in May 1979.
Testimony offered during the course of this hearing consumed
more thcµi 500 pages of testimony (see Transcript beginning at
Rl02).

After hearing all of the evidence the Public Service

Cormnission made the following findings:
"The increase granted by the February 18 Order was
fully justified, and the rates fixed by that order
were just and reasonable rates." (Rl25)
Based upon this and other findings the order from which this appeal
is taken provided:
"It is further ordered that the ~petition for refund
filed on behalf of the Cormnittee of Consumer Services
is denied." (Rl26)
Appellants have failed to state in their brief any basis in fact
for a finding that the rates placed in effect by the February 18
Order were not just and reasonable rates.

Appellants make no

argument that the Commission's finding is not supported by the
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evidence.
The sole remedy sought by Appellants on this appeal is
an order directing the Commission to order a customer refund
for the effective period of the Commission's February 18 Order.
It has long been recognized in this state that the rate-making
function is a legislative function over which the Commission
has exclusive jurisdiction.

In a very recent decision the

Utah Supreme Court considered the very issue which is presented

by the Appellants ;in this case.

In Utah Department of Business

Regulation vs. Public Service Commission, Case No. 16241,
opinion filed June 19, 1980, the majority opinion of the Court
made it clear thatit is not the prerogative of the courts to
direct the Public Service Commission to order customer refunds.
In that case the Appellant contended that the court should
order all amounts collected under a certain rate order refunded
to the consumers.

Although reversing the order which established

the rate, the court declined to order refunds and made it clear
that it is the sole prerogative of the Commission to determine
just and reasonable rates.

The following quotation from the

court's opinion shows the rationale for this conclusion:
"The division further urges this Court to declare
the order of the P.S.C. invalid and void f.rom its ince tion, and to order the amounts collected thereunder
to e re unde . To un erta e sue a course wou
e
tantamount to this Court engaging in rate-making, which
is strict! a le islative ower, for the P.S.C. in
ixing an promu gating rates acts mere y as an arm
of the legislature.
The review by this Court of the
orders of the P.S.C. is confined to the legal issues
of whether there is substantial evidence to sustain
the findings of the P.S.C.; whether the P.S.C. has
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exercised its authority according to law; and whether
any constitutional rig~ts of the compla~ning party
have been invaded or disregarded. Any interference
by this Court beyond the afo:ementioned lim~ts would
constitute an interference with the law making power
of this state." (Pages 11-12) .[Emphasis added]
In this case the Commission after extensive hearings has determined that the rates in effect were just and reasonable rates
and there has been no challenge to these
record.

findings on this

The court is without power to order refunds.
POINT II
WHEN A COMMISSION ORDER IS REVERSED AND REMANDED
BY THE SUPREME COURT THE COMMISSION MAY ADD TO,
MODIFY OR COMPLETE THE FINDINGS At~D/OR ORDER.
The Supreme Court's remand directed the Commission as

follows:
"As we are unable to correlate the findings with
the Commission's Order we reverse and remand the
case to the Commission to take such action, including
further hearings, if necessary, as it deems advisable
for the purpose of achieving a harmonious relationship
between its findings and order." Parowan Pumpers Association v. Public Service Commission 586 P.2d 407, 409.
The Court's remand anticipated amendment of the findings and/
or order to achieve "a harmonious relationship" between the two.
The Rules of Civil Procedures (adopted by the Commission as part
of its Rules of Practice) expressly contemplate the possibility
of modification or addition to the findings on remand.
Rule 76, Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, provides:
"The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm, or
modify any order or judgment appealed from, and may,
in case the f indin s in an case are incom lete in
any respect, or er the Court rom which the appea
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was taken to add to, modif · or com lete the findin s
so as to ma e the same con orm to issues presented in
the facts as the same may be found to be the trial
court from the evidence, and may direct the trial
court enter "ud ent in accordance with the findin s
w en correcte as a oresai , or may irect a new
trial in any case or further proceedings to be had."
[emphasis added] (Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedures, Rule 21.6)
The final sentence of the decision of the Supreme Court
obviously intended to direct the Commission to make such change
in the findings and/or order as would be necessary to achieve
the "harmonious" relationship between the two.

In doing so,

the Court anticipated that the Commission could add to, modify
or complete the findings and/or the order.

The court did,not

direct that the order of the Gommission be vacated.

Cases

decided under Rules 76A, URCP demonstrate a number of the options
available to the Court on the first appeal.

The Court could

have affirmed the Commission's findings and order.

Del Porto

v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972); Doe vs. Doe
48 Utah 200, 158 P.781.

It could have reversed and remanded

without provisions for further hearings.

Openshaw v. Young

107 Utah 399, 152 P.2d 84 (1944); Dunn vs. Wallingford, 47 Utah
491, 155 P.347.

It could have reversed and remanded with

specific directions.

In particular, it could have required the

Commission to conform the order to its findings.

See, Utah

State Road Commission vs. Steele Ranch, 533 P.2d 888 (Utah 1975);
Hargrave vs. Leigh 73 Utah 178, 273 P.298.
reversed and ordered a new hearing.

It could have

Taylor v. Sorenson 30 Utah
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2d 275, 516 P.2d 1394 (1973); Greenhalgh vs. United Tintic Mines
Company, 42 Utah 524, 132 P.390.

Finally, the Supreme Court

could have reversed and remanded with specific instructions to
the Commission that it was to vacate either its findings and/or
order and make findings of fact on all issues tendered by the
petitioners.

Barnes v. Kesler & Sons Const. Co., 549 P.2d 411;

Utah Association of Creditmen vs. Homefire Insurance Company,
36 Utah 20, 102 P.631.
The Court in the Parowan Pumpers decision directed
the Commission to harmonize the findings and order.

This could

be accomplished by amendment of either the findings or the order.
The Commission's Supplemental Report and Order shows the
Commission's rationale for the February 18 Order and reaffirms
that rationale based on further evidence.
undisput~_d

It acknowledges the

fact that new transmission was essential to continued

service and explains why a portion of the expense for new transmission was disallowed. Conversely the order shows the factual
basis for allowing recovery of a portion of the expense and the
rationale for the allocation of the expense.

Its findings with

respect to the necessity for new transmission is not only consistent with but required by the evidence offered at the first
hearing, which was unchanged by the later hearings.

If anything,

the formula for allocating the recovery of the expense disfavored
the utility.
The evidence before the Commission indicated that the
utility had incurred an annual expense in excess of $800,000 for
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the construction of a new transmission line which was essential
to continued electric service to its customers.

The new line

was energized in August of 1976 and the utility cormnenced to
incur and actually paid monthly expenses for the new line from
and after that date.

The Commission's order was not issued

until approximately 6 1/2 months later, February 18, 1977.
this

per~od

During

of time the company received no reimbursement whatever

for the expense.

The Cormnission's order of February 18 allowed

only 53.03% of the expense.

From August 1976 to the present time

the company had paid the entire transmission line expense to
Utah Power & Light but has been able to recover only 53% of that
expense from and after February 18, 1977.

During the effective

period of the order (February 18, 1977 to May 23, 1978), the
company's overall rate of return on its investment was in the
range of 4%.
The Findings of the February 18 Order as supplemented
by those of the Supplemental Order are in complete harmony with
the ordering provisions of the February 18 Order and these
Findings are supported by substantial evidence.
POINT III
WHEN A RATE IS FIXED BY THE COMMISSION AND HAS
NOT BEEN SUSPENDED DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN
APPEAL NO REFUND CAN BE OBTAINED FROM THE
UTILITY COMPANY
The rates approved by the Report and Order in this case
became effective when the Connnission entered an order on February
18, 1977.

Although there is a statutory provision for suspension
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of rates pending an appeal (Section 54-7-17, UCA 1953), no suspension order was sought or entered.

The rates thereafter

charged by CPN were in accordance with the Commission's Order.
CPN was required to charge those rates as long as the order of
the Commission remained in effect.
The general rule of law is that where a rate fixed by
the Commission has not been suspended during the pendency of
an appeal and the Commission's Order is ultimately vacated or
set aside as unreasonable no refund can be obtained from the
utility.

Thus, even if the February 18 Order had been vacated,

no refund may be allowed.
In Keco Industries, Inc. v. The Cincinnati & Suburban
Bell Tel. Co. (Ohio), 141 N.E.2d 465, telephone subscribers
sought a refund for the difference between the original

rate

and an increased rate under a Public Utilities Connnission Order
which was subsequently held unreasonable and unlawful.

In

denying the right to recover a refund the Supreme Court of
Ohio said:
(141 N.E.2d 465, 568-469)
"In the present case we have rates which were
established by the properly designated authority
after a hearing and consideration in full compliance
wi~h the law, and until such time as they· .were set
aside by the Supreme Court, they were, in the absence
of a stay, the lawful rates and the only ones which
could be collected by the utility.

"From the above consideration it is our conclusion that the rates of a public utility on Ohio
are subject to a general statutory plan of regulation
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and collection; that any rates set by the Public
Utilities Cormnission are the lawful rates until
such time as they are set aside as being unreasonable
and unlawful by the Supreme Court; and that the
General Assembly, by providing a method whereby such
rates may be suspended until final determination as
to their reasonableness or lawfulness by the Supreme
Court, has completely abrogated the common-law remedy
of restitution in such cases."
In Mandel Brothers, Inc. vs. Chicago Tunnel Terminal
Co.

(Illinois), 117 N.E. 2d 774, the Illinois Supreme Court

denied refunds in a similar case holding:
(117 N.E. 2d 774, 775)
"The fundamental issue in this case is whether
a rate which has been approved by the Commerce Commission after a hearing as to its reasonableness
can be termed an 'excessive' rate for the purpose
of awarding reparations. We hold that it cannot,
even though the rate approved by the connnission has
subsequently been set aside upon judicial review.

"* * * 'Where the charges collected by the
carrier were based upon rates which had theretofore
been established or approved by the public authority,
the fact that such rates are subsequently reduced
afford no right of action for damages or for the
recovery of the difference between the old and new
rates upon the ground that the prior rate was unreasonable, unless such right is conferred by the
~overning statute, as is held to be the case in some
Jurisdictions. '"
In Foshee vs. General Telephone Co. of the Southeast
(Alabama), 322 So.2d 715, the Alabama Supreme Court in denying
the right to refund held:
(322 So.2d 715, 717)
"Code of Ala., Tit 48, §§104, 144, establishes
That there can be but one lawful rate. Moreover
under these statutes a regulated public utility
can charge only the rate established by the APSC.
Until the APSC on remand modified their rate schedule
pursuant to order of the circuit court, General
Telephone could charge and collect no other rate
except that established by the APSC in its order of
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30 October 1972. Hence it is clear that General
Telephone is under no legal or equitable obligation
to refund any money to their subscribers since it
did only what it was required to do by statute."
See also State vs. Alabama Public Service Connnission (Alabama)
307 So.2d521, where the Court holds that no refund can be made
unless the rate is suspended and explains the rationale for
the rule.
A similar situation was presented in Straube vs. Bowling
Green Gas Co. (Missouri), 227 S.W.2d 666, where customers of a
gas company sought to recover a refund which had been made to the
gas company by its gas supplier.

The gas rates of the utility

were reduced in consequence of a reduction in purchased gas
expense but the customers sought recovery from the utility for
a prior period covered by the gas expense refund.

In denying

recovery, the Missouri Supreme Court said:
( 227

s . w. 2 d

6 66' 6 71)

"When the established rate of a utility has been
followed, the amount so collected becomes the property
of the utility of which it cannot be deprived by either
legislative or judicial action without violating the
due process provisions of the State and Federal
Constitutions."
The general rule is SUIIDllarized in 9 Am Jur 542, § 175:
"Where the charges collected by the carrier
were based upon rates which had theretofore been
established or approved by the public authority,
the fact that such rates are subsequently reduced
afford no right of action for damages or for the
recovery of the difference between the old and new
rates upon the ground that the prior rate was unreasonable, unless such right is conferred by the
governing statute, as is held to be the case in some
jurisdictions."
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The Utah statutes are substantially the same as those
construed in the cases above-cited.

Under Section 54-7-17, U.C.A.,

1953, the pendency of the appeal does not stay the order, but any
party may apply to the Court for a suspension Order suspending
the rates under the Connnission's Report and Order during the
pendency of the appeal.

This was not done.
POINT IV

SECTION 54-7-17 UCA 1953 DOES NOT REQUIRE OR
PERMIT A REFUND IN THIS CASE.
Appellant argues that 54-7-17 (4)
for an automatic refund.

provides a mechanism

From this discordant premise Appellant

seeks to have the Supreme Court reverse the Connnission and
order a refund.

This interpretation misreads section 54-7-17.

This section of the code is divided into four subsections.

54-7-17(1) reads:
"The pendency of a writ of review shall not
of itself stay or suspend the operation of the
order or decision of the connnission, but during
the pendency of such writ the Supreme Court in
its discretion may stay or suspend, in whole or
in part, the operation of the commission's order
or decision."
The first subsection establishes the option for the
Supreme Court to stay or suspend an order of the Commission
pending an appeal.

54-7-17(2) reads:
"No order so staying or suspending an order or
decision of the commission shall be made by the Supreme
Court otherwise than upon three days' notice and
after hearing, and if the order or decisio~ of the
commission is suspended, the order suspending t~e same
shall contain a specific finding, based upon evidence
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submitted to the court and identified by reference
thereto that great or irreparable damage would
otherwi~e result to the petitioner, and specifying
the nature of the damage."
The second subsection establishes the requirement of
a hearing with advance written notice to the parties to be held
before any stay or suspension can be granted.
The third subsection, §54-7-17(3), specifies that in
the event a stay or suspension is granted a suspending bond must
be posted and in certain circumstances the utility is required to
deposit revenues with the court to insure the availability of
reftmd monies if the order on appeal is reversed.

54-7-17(4) provides:
"In case the Supreme Court stays or suspends
any order or decision lowering any rate, fare, toll,
rental, charge or classification, the cormnission
upon the execution and approval of such suspending
bond shall forthwith require the public utility
affected, under penalty of the immediate enforcement
of the order or decision of the cormnission pending
the review and notwithstanding the suspending order,
to keep such accounts, verified by oath, as may
in the judgment of the commission suffice to show the
amounts being charged or received by such public
utility pending the review in excess of the charges
allowed by the order or decision of the commission,
together with the names and address of the persons
to whom overcharges will be refundable, in case the
charges made by the public utility pending the review
are not s.us.tai11ed 1by the Supreme Court. The court
may from time to time require such party petitioning
for a review to give additional security or to increase
the said suspending bond whenever in the opinion of
the court the same may be necessary to ensure the
prompt payment of such damages and such overcharges.
Upon the final decision by the Supreme Court all
moneys which the public utility may have collected
pending the appeal in excess of those authorized by
such final decision, together with interest in case
the court ordered the deposit of such moneys in a
bank or trust company, shall be promptly paid to
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the persons entitled thereto in such manner and
through such methods of distribution as may be prescribed by the cormnission. If any such moneys
shall not have been claimed by the persons entitled
thereto within one year from the final decision of
the Supreme Court, the commission shall cause notice
to such persons to be given by publication, once
a week for two successive weeks, in a newspaper of
general circulation printed and published in the city
and county of Salt Lake, and in such other newspaper
or newspapers as may be designated by the commission;
said notice to state the names of the persons entitled
to such moneys and the amount due each person. All
moneys not claimed within three months after the
publication of such notice shall be paid by the
public utility under the direction of the cormnission
into the state treasury for the benefit of the general
fund.''
The fourth subsection establishes an accounting procedure to
insure the proper distribution of a refund after final decision
of the Court.
Appellants cite section 54-7-17(4) and argue that this
subsection is "directly applicable to this case."

Subsection (4)

by its own language applies "In case the Supreme Court stays or
suspends any order or decision lowering any rates . . . "and
provides in such cases that "all monies which the public utility
may have collected pending the appeal in excess of those
authorized by such final decision . . . shall be [refunded]".
It should be noticed that this subsection applies only to cases
where the rates are suspended and where the orQer lowers the
preexisting rates.

This section supports the position of the

Respondents in this case because it requires, as a condition
to the refund, that the Connnission's order be suspended by the
Court.

That was not done.
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The Appellants rely on The Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph vs. Public Service Commission,
P.2d 184.

107 Utah 520, 155

That case is not supportive of Appellant's position

because in that case the parties preserved the right to the
reftmd by following the provisions of Section 54-7-17(4).
court issued an order suspending the rates.

The

If applicable to this

at all, the opinion in that case supports the Respondents position
in this case that no refund is appropriate where the rates remain
in effect without suspension or stay.
Appellant relies heavily upon the case of the City of
Los Angeles vs. The Public Service Commission (California 497
P.2d 786).

That case is easily distinguishable.

The California

Court had issued a stay directing that all sums collected by
the utility pursuant to the rates authorized by the Commission
should be subject to refund upon order of the Court should the
Commission's decision be annulled or modified.

The Commission's

decision was set aside and the Court ordered the utility to make
refunds.
CCS also relies upon the case of The Mountain States
Telephone & Telegrar.hCo. vs. Public Service Commission (Colorado)
502 P.2d 945.

In that case the Colorado Court acknowledged case

law supporting the rule that a rate is not subject to refund
if it is approved by a regulatory commission and collected
without suspension or bond.

The Court recognized the validity

of the general proposition that when a regulatory commission
fixes rates for the future in one proceedings, it cannot, in
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a subsequent proceeding, decide that the previously approved
rates were unreasonable and thereupon establish lower rates
with retroactive effect.

In distinguishing these cases the

Colorado Supreme Court said:
(502 P.2d 945, 949)
"This rule is not applicalbe to the facts before
us. This Court, on appeal, not the Commission in a
subsequent proceeding, decided that a portion of the
1969 Rate Order was in error. This Court, not the
Connnission, found that benefits resulting from the
correction of those errors should be aassed on to
Motmtain Bell customers. [emphasis a ded]

"This Court may, on review of a Cormnission Rate
Order, require correction of legal errors contained
in the Order and provide that benefits arising from
those corrections be passed on to the consumers of
the utility." [emphasis added]
The exception carved out by the Colorado Supreme Court applies
where the Court (not the Cormnission) orders refunds "passed on
to the consumers of the utility".

In each case cited by CCS

the Court (not the regulatory connnission) has undertaken to order
the refund (see City of Los Angeles vs. Public Utility Commission
et al.,

(California), 497 P.2d 785; Mountain States Telephone

& Telegraph Co. vs. Public Utility Connnission, supra; California
Municipal League vs. Public Utility Commission (California),
473 P.2d 960).

In each of those cases the Court actually deter-

mined that the Commission had erred in its determination of testyear expenses and/or rate base and that the ultimate findings
were therefore unsupported by the evidence.

In all but the

Colorado case the rates had been suspended during the appeal
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proceedings.

This is not the case with the Supreme Court's

decision before this Commission.
with respect to the evidence.

The Court made no determination

The case was remanded solely

because of the inconsistency between the Findings and the Order
with directions to "harmonize" the two.

More important, the

Court in this case has not vacated the rate order and has not
directed that the utility make refunds to its customers, and
there is no argument or evidence that the Conmiission erred in
making any of the findings made by it or that such findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.
In summary, neither Section 54-7-17, U.C.A. 1953 nor
cases cited by the Appellants are applicable to this case.
Numerous decisions from many separate jurisdictions support the
rule that refunds may not be required where the rates are fixed
by the Commission and remain in effect without suspension
during the pendency of the appeal period (see Point III).
POINT V
A REFUND ORDER WOULD BE CLEARLY AGAINST
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE HEARD BY THE
COMMISSION. EVEN IF THE COMMISSION WAS
WITHOUT POWER TO MODIFY ITS FINDINGS IT
HAS THE POWER IN A PASS THRU CASE TO
PLACE A RATE INTO EFFECT FOR A PRIOR
PERIOD OF TIME TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF
UTILITY EXPENSES.
.
The Commission did not act in ignorance.

There was

a rationale for both the original order and the Supplemental
Report and Order.

Although we do not concur with the rationale

which does not allow recovery of all of the transmission line
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expense we do understand the Commission's reasoning in allowing
only 53.03% of such expense.

The allocation of transmission line

expense was based upon actual usage of the transmission line as
between the jurisdictional rate-payers and the Bureau of Reclamation.

The evidence on which the allocation was made is not in

dispute.

If the allocation was unjust, it favored the customers

because it placed the burden for almost 50% of a utility expense
upon the shareholders of the utility with no means to recover
that expense.
But even if the February 18 Order were vacated there should
be no refund of revenues paid during the effective period of that
Order.

As previously observed, the general rule of law is that

where a rate fixed by the Commission has not been suspended during
the pendency of an appeal and the Commission's Order is ultimately
vacated or set aside as unreasonable, no refunds can be obtained
from the utility.

(See Point III)

Appellants take the position that the Commission's
February 18 Order was a nullity, and that the only lawful rates
in effect during the period in question were those in existence
prior to the Commission's Order.

Appellants' position is based

upon the decision of the California Supreme Court in the 1972
case of City of Los Angeles, et al. vs. Public Utility Commission,
et al, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 497 P.2d 785.

In that case the

California Supreme Court said that:
"When the rates set in the decision before us
are annulled, the only lawful rates are th~s: which
were in existence prior to the instant decision. We
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are satisfied that to permit the commission to fix
new rates for the purpose of refunds, as requested
by Pacific would involve retroactive rate making in
violation ~f the principles recognized in Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., v. Public Util. Comm. supra, 62
Cal.Zd 634, 649-656, 44 Cal. Rptr. l, 401 P.2d 353."
As we have already pointed out, the 1972 Los Angeles
case is clearly distinguishable because in that case the rate
was suspended during the pendency of the appeal and revenues
were collected subject to refund.

Furthermore, in the Los

Angeles case, unlike the case now before the Court, the reviewing
Court actually vacated the Commission's Order.

The Utah Supreme

Court did not vacate but instead remanded to achieve harmony
between the Findings and Order.

There is another reason, however,

why the Los Angeles case has no application to the case now
before the Commission.
The Los Angeles case was a general rate case.

In

more recent decisions the California Supreme Court has held that
the rule stated in that case and in the earlier case of Pacific

Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission, (CalifornL
1965) 401 P.2d 355, (also cited by Appellant) applies only to
general rate cases and has no application to "off-set" or "passthru" rate cases which do not involve the general rate making
process.

In Southern California Edison Company

vs. Public

Utility Commission, 144 Cal. Rptr. 905. 576 P.2d (1978) the Court
permitted retroactive adjustment of rates in a pass-through rate
case on the rationale that the cost adjustment did not constitute
"rate mak1" ng".

Ref erring
·
t o th e Los An ge 1 es an d Paci· f 1c
· cases,
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the California Court distinguished them as follows:
(576 P.2d 945)
"We question neither the rule stated in the
foregoing decisions nor its application to the facts
there presented. But this is not such a case. At
the risk of belaboring the obvious, we observe that
before there can be retroactive rate-making there
must at least be ratemaking. There undoubtedly was
ratemaking in both Pacific Te. & Tel. and City of
Los Angeles I; as we shall explain, however, ratemaking within the meaning of the cited decisions
did not occur in the case at bar."
In a footnote to

its decision the Court distinguished the

Pacific case:
(Footnote 3, 576 P.2d 946)
"Pacific Tel. & Tel. relied on a number of
decisions of federal courts and our sister states
which likewise held that rate-fixing orders could
operate only prospectively. (62 Cal.2d at pp. 650652, 44 Cal. Rpts. 1, 401 P.2d 353.) But an examination of each shows that all involved various types
of general rate orders and none remotely resembled
the situation now before us."
Thus, the most recent decisions of the California Supreme Court
have limited the rule prohibiting retroactive rate making to a
general rate case and have determined that the rule has no
application to the abbreviated "offset" or "pass-thru" proceedings.
Indeed the court has approved retroactive adjustment of rates
in pass-thru cases.

The distinction between the "general" and

"pass-thru" cases is described in California Manufacturers
Association v. Public Utility Connnission, Southern California
Gas Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company, California
(1979) 595 P.2d 98.

In that case the California Supreme Court

said:
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"In a general rate s~tting proceeding, the
Commission determines for a test period the utility's
expense, the utility's rate base and the rate of
return to be allowed. Using those figures the
Commission determines the revenue requirement, and
then fixes the rates for the consumers to produce
sufficient income to meet the revenue requirements ...
The rates are fixed in the general proceedings on the
basis of historical data. Adjustments may be made
in that proceeding for anticipated future extraordinary changes . . . . It is obvious, revenues, expense,
and rate base arrived at on historical data will not
remain constant in future years when the rates take
effect. The assumption underlying fixing of future
rates on historical data is that for future years
changes in the revenues, expense and rate base will
vary proportionately so that the utility will receive
a fair.rate of return. 595 P.2d 98, 100.
"When an item of either expense or revenue tends
to vary abnormally in comparison to the utility's
other financial criteria, adjustment of rates charged
have been permitted in abbreviated proceedings . . . .
Such proceedings--termed off-set proceedinp,s by the
parties--have been used in the past to make rate
adjustments necessitated by increases in fuel costs
disproportionate to the variations in other costs."
595 P.2d 98, 101.
The California Manufacturers case involved an offset or passthru type proceedings to recover increased fuel costs.

In

holding that rule against retroactive rate making has no effect
in such a case, the Court said:
"The utilities' briefs were filed prior to
the recent decision in Southern California Edison Co.
vs. Public Utility Connnission, supra, 20 Cal. 3d 813.
In that case the Court held that rate changes based on
increased fuel costs do not involve rate making and
that therefore the rule against retroactive rate making
was not applicable ... " 595 P.2d 98, 103.
The case now before the court is an "offset" or "passthru" type proceeding for recovery of extraordinary expense.
is not a general rate making proceeding.

Therefore, under the
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It

California Rule, the Commission had jurisdiction in this case to
make a new determination with respect to that portion of the
transmission line expense which should be allowed and to give
that determination retroactive effect.

In other words even

if the February 18 Order were technically a nullity as claimed
by Appellants (an argument Respondent does not concede), the
Commission under the California Rule (and even if the rate had
been susnended in this case) could have subsequently detert!lined
that allowance of 53.03% of the expense or any other portion thereof
was reasonable and could have then given such determination
retroactive effect.

The evidence offered during the several days

of hearings on remand fully support such a result and Appellants
make no argument that the Conrrnission's order is not supported
by substantial evidence.

The findings in the Supplemental Order

expressly determine just and reasonable rates for the effective
period of the February 18 Order.

It is noteworthy that the same

issue of transmission line expense was treated by the Commission
in the general rate case which followed 76-023-04.

In 77-023-08

the Commission made the same ruling allowing 53.03% of the Utah
Power & Light transmission expense.
that case.

No appeal was taken from

(See Rl24-125)
There is an additional flaw in the legalistic argument

urged by the Appellants.

Counsel for the Appellants argued

before the Conrrnission that if the February 18 order was a nullity,
the only lawful rate was that rate in effect prior to the filing
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of the case.

This is not true because the next preceding rate

Order was a Tentative Order issued September 29, 1976 in Case
No. 76-023-04 and pursuant to that Order Tariffs were filed
and became effective September 30, 1976.

That Order allowed

recovery of more revenue than the Final Order issued February
18, 1977.

No appeal was taken from the Tentative Order.

Further,

even assuming, arguendo, that the Tentative Order was rendered
ineffectual by a succeeding order which is a "nullity",
Appellants have an additional obstacle in their argument that
rates preceding the filing of the case should have prevailed.
Under the provisions of Section 54-7-12, U.C.A., 1953, a rate
filed by a utility becomes final at the expiration of 120 days.
The rates in 76-023-04 were filed June 30, 1976.

If the

Commission's Order of February 18, 1977 was a nullity, as claimed
by the Appellants, and the Order of September 29, 1976 had no
legal effect, then the rates filed by CPN in Case No. 76-023-04
became final by virtue of the expiration of the suspension
period and the utility is entitled to recover the full amount
of such rates which includes all of the expense disallowed in
the February 18 Order.
CONCLUSION
The Commission has determined just and reasonable
rates for the period in dispute and that determination is supported
by substantial evidence.

The Commission has power to modify

and add to its Findings on remand.

The modifications made by
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it are supported by reason and by the evidence and result in
complete harmony between the Findings and the Order.
is required or should be permitted in this case.
mental

Re~ort

No refund

The Supple-

and Order should be affirmed.

Resµectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Grant Macfarlane, Jr.
Patrick Shea
Attorneys for CP National Corporation
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